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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
RACHEL ARMELINDA CINTRON, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
Case No. 16440 
ELMA J. MILKOVICH, 
Defendant and 
Appellant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to recover damages for injuries arising out 
of an automobile accident which occurred on Saturday, February 14, 
1976, at about 5:00 p.m. on Center Street in Midvale, Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before The Honorable Ernest F. 
Baldwin, Judge, sitting with a jury. In answering a special ver-
diet, the jury concluded that defendant was negligent in that 
she failed to keep a proper lookout and failed to yield the 
right-of-way to plaintiff. The jury also concluded that 
plaintiff was negligent in that she failed to keep her vehicle 
under reasonable, safe and proper control, and drove at a speed 
that was not safe, reasonable and prudent under the circumstan-
ces. The jury entered a finding of 60 percent causal negligence 
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on the part of the defendant and 40 percent causal negligence on 
the part of the plaintiff. Defendant filed and argued a motion 
for a new trial, which motion was denied by the court. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The defendant/appellant seeks reversal of the judgment 
of the lower court and judgment in defendant's favor as a matter 
of law or, in the alternative, a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
~ ~~-
The accident upon which plaintiff premises her cause of 
action occurred at approximately 5:00 p.m. on Saturday, the 14th 
day of February, 1976, approximately 26 feet west of the inter-
section of Center and Allen Streets in Midvale, Utah. Center 
Street runs east and west, consisting of two through lanes in 
each direction. Allen Street runs north and south with one lane 
in each direction. As Center Street approaches the intersection 
with Allen Street, it becomes wider so as to include left turn 
lanes in each direction of travel to accomodate traffic turning 
on to Allen Street from Center Street. The eastbound and west-
bound lanes on Center Street are separated by a raised island on 
each side of the intersection with Allen Street. (See Exhibits 
5-P and 8-D). The speed limit on Center Street as it approaches 
the intersection with Allen Street is 35 miles per hour. Traff~ 
approaching Center Street from the south on Allen Street is 
required to stop at a stop sign before entering or crossing 
Center Street. 
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The accident involved in this litigation occurred during 
a daylight hour. The surface of Center Street was dry. Immediately 
prior to the accident plaintiff, who was 19 at the time, was travel-
ing west on Center Street in the inside lane. Plaintiff was 
accompanied by a friend, Lonnie Miyagishima, who was seated in 
the front seat on the passenger side, and plaintiff's sister, 
Tanya Salazar, who was sitting in the back seat. At this same 
time defendant was approaching Center Street from the south on 
Allen Street. Defendant was accompanied by her son, Ray Hinckle, 
who was sitting in the middle of the back seat and her daughter, 
Lynnette Lemmon, who was sitting in the front seat on the 
passenger side. 
At trial plaintiff testified that when she last observed 
the speedometer of her car, a few moments before the accident, 
she was traveling at 30 miles per hour (Tr. 46). Plaintiff's 
sister, Tanya Salazar, testified that she observed plaintiff's 
speed at about the same time and that such speed was between 30 
and 35 miles per hour (Tr. 90). Grant Elsby, the Midvale City 
policeman who investigated this accident, testified that plain-
tiff stated, in a conversation with Officer Elsby at the scene 
shortly after the accident, that she was traveling at approxima-
tely 40 miles per hour at the time of the accident (Tr. 32,41). 
Defendant's daughter, Lynnette Lemmon, testified that in this 
conversation plaintiff stated that she was traveling between 40 
and 45 miles per hour (Tr. 110). Defendant also stated that in 
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this conversation plaintiff stated her speed was between 40 and 
45 miles per hour (Tr. 122). Plaintiff stated that she had told 
Officer Elsby that she was going between 30 and 40 miles per 
hour at the time of the accident (Tr. 60). Plaintiff also testU 
that she accelerated her automobile after she last observed the 
speedometer prior to the accident so as to maintain her speed up 
a rise in the grade of Center Street as it approaches the inter-
section with Allen Street (Tr. 59). 
As plaintiff, traveling west on Center Street, 
approached the intersection of Center Street and Allen Street, 
defendant was approaching this same intersection from the south 
on Allen street. Plaintiff first observed defendant's vehicle~ 
defendant was approaching the stop sign on Allen Street (Tr. 46), 
According to the plaintiff, defendant appeared to stop at the 
stop sign but in fact did not stop (Tr. 46,47,57). However, at 
trial it was noted that plaintiff stated in her deposition that 
defendant's vehicle appeared to stop at the stop sign (Tr. 62). 
Defendant testified that she stopped at the stop sign, looked to 
see if any vehicle was approaching, and then asked both her son 
and daughter to look also (Tr. 114). Defendant's son (Tr. 98) 
and daughter (Tr. 105) both testified that defendant stopped at 
the stop sign and that defendant asked both to look for oncoming 
vehicles. 
Defendant (Tr. 115), her daughter, Lynnette (Tr. 105), 
and her son, Ray (Tr. 98), all stated that, upon checking for 
oncoming vehicles approaching from either direction, they saw 
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nothing. Because Center Street immediately east of the Allen 
Street intersection dips as it passes under Interstate 15, it is 
difficult for westbound traffic on Center Street to get an 
unobstructed view of the Allen Street intersection as it 
approaches such intersection from the east. (See Exhibits 5-P 
and 10-D). For this same reason, it is difficult for traffic at 
the intersection to see such westbound traffic. Believing the 
way to be clear, defendant proceeded into the intersection and 
turned into the inside westbound lane. Defendant estimated her 
speed to be approximately 10 miles per hour when the accident 
occurred (Tr. 78). 
Upon observing defendant proceeding into the intersec-
tion, plaintiff slammed on her brakes (Tr. 47). In doing so, 
plaintiff's vehicle, according to Officer Elsby, left skid marks 
approximately 37 feet 6 inches in length (Tr. 34). Realizing 
that she would be unable to stop in time to avoid a collision, 
plaintiff released her brakes and swerved to the right (Tr. 47). 
Officer Elsby indicated that the skid marks left by plaintiff's 
vehicle ended at the west boundary of the intersection (Tr. 34,35). 
Officer Elsby determined by measurement that the probable point 
of impact was approximately 26 feet 1 inch from this same boun-
dary (Tr. 35). Plaintiff acknowledged that this point was indeed 
the probable point of impact (Tr. 64). 
At trial plaintiff called as a witness one Dr. Rudy 
Limpert, an accident reconstruction expert. For purposes of exa-
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mining Dr. Limpert, plaintiff's counsel asked Dr. Limpert to 
assume that a vehicle was traveling at 35 miles per hour under 
circumstances similar to those encountered by plaintiff. (Tr. 7~ 
Dr. Limpert also assumed that the surface of the highway upon 
which this vehicle was traveling had a coefficient of friction 
of 0.65 (Tr. 781), the coefficient of friction of Center Street 
as determined by a skid test performed by Officer Elsby (Tr. 19) 
Based on this assumption, Dr. Limpert testified that vigorous 
braking of a vehicle traveling at 35 miles per hour would cause 
that vehicle to stop within 63 feet (Tr. 781). Because the 
length of the skid marks of plaintiff's vehicle was 37 feet 6 
inches and the distance from the termination of said skid marks 
to the probable point of impact was 26 feet 1 inch, Dr. Limpert 
testified that a vehicle traveling 35 miles per hour would have 
stopped by the time it reached the probable point of impact 
(Tr. 78n). 
Dr. Limpert testified that defendant's vehicle had tra-
veled approximately 90 feet from the time it entered the inter-
section to the time of impact (Tr. 780). Since defendant's spe~ 
at the point of impact was approximately 10 miles an hour, and 
because defendant reached this speed from a standing start, Dr. 
Limpert estimated that the average speed of defendant's vehicle, 
assuming a uniform acceleration, was 5 miles per hour during th~ 
time span (Tr. 780). Assuming this average speed, Dr. Limpert 
concluded that it would have taken defendant approximately 12 
seconds to cover the distance from the stop sign to the probable 
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point of impact (Tr. 780). Dr. Limpert then testified that the 
driver of a vehicle, traveling at a speed of 35 miles per hour, 
would have first observed a vehicle entering the intersection 
from the stop sign approximately 615 feet prior to reaching the 
intersection (Tr. 780). By comparison, the Interstate 15 viaduct 
is 357.0 feet east of the east boundary of the intersection. (See 
Exhibit 1-D). Finally, Dr. Limpert testified that, assuming an 
average reaction time, and given the probable point of impact and 
the length and location of the skid marks left by plaintiff's 
vehicle, plaintiff first reacted approximately 115 feet from the 
probable point of impact (Tr. 78p). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
BECAUSE PLAINTIFF'S VEHICLE WAS NOT AN 
"IMMEDIATE HAZARD" WITHIN THE MEANING 
OF UTAH CODE ANN. §41-6-72.10(2), 
DEFENDANT COULD NOT BE GUILTY OF FAILING 
TO YIELD THE RIGHT OF WAY TO PLAINTIFF. 
According to Utah Code Ann. §41-6-72.10(2) (1953), a 
driver stopped at a stop sign, "shall yield the right of way to 
any vehicle in the intersection or approaching on another roadway 
so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time 
when such driver is moving across or within the intersection or 
junction of roadways." [Emphasis added.J According to this sta-
tute, defendant was required to yield the right of way to plain-
tiff only if plaintiff's vehicle constituted an "immediate 
hazard" during the time defendant was moving across or within the 
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intersection. 
This court, in Richards~ Anderson, 9 Utah 2d 17, 337 
P.2d 59 (1959), addressed the definition of the term "immediate 
hazard". This case involved an intersectional collision between 
vehicles driven by Anderson and Richards. After stopping at a 
stop sign, Anderson proceeded into the intersection after two 
drivers, traveling in the same direction as Richards, had 
deferred to Anderson. After traveling 38 feet, Anderson's and 
Richards' vehicles collided. In discussing the term "immediate 
hazard", as it pertained to Richards' claim of right of way, 
this court said: 
[TJhe Supreme Court of Delaware has said 
that an "immediate hazard" is created 
when a vehicle approaches an intersection 
on a favored street at ~ reasonable spe~d 
under such circumstances that, if the dis-
favored driver proceeds into the inter-
section, it will force the favored driver 
to sharply and suddenly check his 
progress or stop in order to avoid colli-
sion. (Citing Fusco.~ Dauphin, 47 Del. 
140, 88 A.2d 813 (1950). Conversely, if 
the disfavored driver has made his stop 
and deferred to all vehicles that would 
be required to go into a sharp or sudden 
braking to avoid collision, the cars far 
enough away have a clear margin to 
observe and make a smooth and safe stop 
are not an "immediate hazard" and are 
required to yield to the driver already 
at the intersection. 337 P.2d at 61. 
[Emphasis added.] 
Defendant submits that plaintiff's vehicle was not "an 
immediate hazard" within the definition given this term by this 
court. To begin with, plaintiff was not operating her vehicle~ 
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a reasonable speed. Moreover, the fact that Officer Elsby deter-
mined the probable point of impact to be more than 26 feet west 
of the west boundary of the intersection at issue is prima facie 
evidence that plaintiff's vehicle was not an "immediate hazard" 
while defendant was moving across or within the intersection. 
Plaintiff's expert witness, Dr. Rudy Limpert, testified 
that the accident occurred 12 seconds after defendant had entered 
the intersection. Dr. Limpert also testified that defendant's 
vehicle had traveled 90 feet during such time span. Finally, Dr. 
Limpert testified that plaintiff, had she been traveling at the 
speed limit of 35 miles per hour, would have been 615 feet east 
of the intersection when defendant entered the intersection. Yet 
the evidence, according to Dr. Limpert, indicated that plaintiff 
did not react until she was 115 feet from the point of impact. 
Under these circumstances, defendant finds it difficult to 
comprehend how plaintiff's vehicle could constitute an "immediate 
hazard" so as to require defendant to yield the right of way to 
plaintiff. 
In support of her position defendant directs this 
court's attention to its opinion in Richards, 330 P.2d at 61, 
where, in holding in defendant's favor, it said: 
It is clear that the defendant entered the 
intersection considerably ahead of the 
plaintiff. The question then becomes 
whether plaintiff's automobile was so 
close to the intersection to constitute an 
"immediate hazard" to defendant when the 
latter entered the intersection. There 
is, of course, no precise set of measure-
ments by which an immediate hazard can be 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
guaged. It must be judged on the basis of 
common sense in the light of existing 
circumstances. 
* * * An analysis of the time, speed and 
distance factors shows plainly that the 
plaintiff had more than ample time to 
observe the defendant and avoid colliding 
with him. 
Defendant maintains that the above quoted language 
conclusively shows that plaintiff's vehicle was not "an immediab 
hazard" within the meaning of the statute. Plaintiff testified 
that she saw defendant's vehicle approach the intersection and 
proceed into the intersection. Notwithstanding her observations 
plaintiff proceeded to travel at the same speed and in the same 
lane. It is apparent that plaintiff had ample opportunity to 
avoid this accident. It is equally apparent that she failed to 
avail herself of this opportunity. As was said by this court in 
Richards, 337 P.2d 15 at 61,62, "the plaintiff seemed to have 
been guilty of the all too common fault of modern drivers of 
assuming that because they are on a through highway they have ~ 
absolute right of way, and that one desiring to enter or cross t 
must do so at his peril." 
POINT II. 
-----
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING DEFEN-
DANT'S JURY INSTRUCTION THAT, UNDER MIDVALE 
CITY ORDINANCE §187(b), THE DRIVER OF ANY 
VEHICLE TRAVELING AT AN UNLAWFUL SPEED SHALL 
FORFEIT ANY RIGHT OF WAY WHICH SHE MIGHT 
OTHERWISE HAVE. 
Assuming arguendo that plaintiff's vehicle was an "imrn~ 
diate hazard" as contemplated in Utah Code Ann. §41-6-72.10(2) 
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(1953), defendant still could not be guilty of failure to yield 
the right of way to the plaintiff because plaintiff forfeited, 
under Midvale City Ordinance 8187(b), any right of way to which 
she might be entitled. 
Prior to trial, defendant filed a certified copy of 
Midvale City Ordinance §187(b), which provided: 
LOSING RIGHT OF WAY 
* * * (b) The driver of any vehicle traveling 
at an unlawful speed shall forfeit any 
right of way which he might otherwise have. 
Pursuant to this provision, defendant submitted to the 
court its requested jury instruction no. 18 which provided as 
follows: 
Under the ordinances of Midvale City it 
is provided that the driver of any vehicle 
traveling at an unlawful speed shall for-
feit any right of way he might otherwise 
have. If, therefore, you find from the 
evidence in this case that the plaintiff's 
vehicle was being driven at an unlawful 
speed, then I instruct you that the right 
of way which she might otherwise have had 
at such intersection would be forfeited. 
This instruction was a proper statement of the law as it existed 
in Midvale City at the time of the accident. Furthermore, this 
instruction was warranted in view of the evidence received at 
trial. The issue as to whether the speed at which plaintiff was 
operating her vehicle at the time of the accident was reasonable 
and prudent under the conditions was framed at trial and properly 
submitted to the jury. (See Jury Instruction No. 17). 
Nevertheless, the court, without explanation, refused defendant's 
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jury instruction no. 18 and gave no instruction pertaining to a 
forfeiture of plaintiff's right of way or the effects thereof h 
the event the plaintiff was traveling at an unlawful speed. 
Defendant took exception to the court's failure to gi~ 
the requested instruction and filed and argued a motion for a ru 
trial, which motion the lower court refused. Defendant asserts 
that the lower court committed prejudicial error in failing to 
instruct the jury on the applicable law, for as the lower court 
said in its second instruction to the jury, "It is the duty of 
the court to instruct you in the law that applies to this case .. 
Defendant is confident that this court, upon an examination of 
the applicable law, will find that the lower court did commit 
prejudicial error in refusing defendant's requested jury instrlli 
tion no. 18. 
Utah law with regard to traffic rules and regulationsi 
found in Utah Code Ann. §§41-6-1 to 179 (1953). With regard 
to rights of way, as applied to this case, the statute reads as 
follows: 
Except when directed to proceed by police 
officer, every driver of a vehicle approach-
ing a stop sign shall mark at a clearly 
marked stop line, but if none, before 
entering the crosswalk on the near side 
of the intersection, or if none, at the 
point nearest the intersecting roadway where 
the driver has a view of approaching traffic 
on the intersecting roadway before entering 
it. After having stopped, the driver shall 
yield the right of way to any vehicle in 
the intersection or approaching on another 
roadway so closely as to cause an immediate 
hazard during the time which such drive 
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is moving across or within the intersection 
or junction of roadway. Id. §41-6-72.10(2) 
(Supp. 1979) 
Defendant acknowledges that the operation of her automobile as 
she approached and entered Center Street from Allen Street was 
governed by the above quoted statute, and that by such statute 
she was bound to yield the right of way to any vehicle on Center 
Street having such a right of way. Because the jury specifically 
found that plaintiff was operating her vehicle at an unlawful 
speed at the time of the accident, defendant asserts that plain-
tiff, under Midvale City Ordinance §187(b), forfeited any right 
of way to which she might otherwise be entitled. Accordingly, 
plaintiff had no right of way to which defendant was obligated to 
yield. 
It is well established in Utah that a city has the right 
to legislate on the same subject as a state statute under its 
general police powers or as a result of an express grant of 
authority from the legislature. see, ~· Salt Lake City ~ 
Allred, 20 Utah 2d 298, 437 P.2d 434 (1968): Salt Lake City~ 
Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 93 P.2d 671 (1938). Notwithstanding this 
principle, defendant recognizes that the traffic rules and regu-
lations set forth by statute are required, by statute, to be 
applied on a uniform basis statewide. 
The provisions of this act shall be 
applicable and uniform through the state 
and in all political subdivisions and 
municipalities therein and no local 
authority shall enact or enforce any rule 
or regulation in conflict with the provi-
sions of this act unless expressly 
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authorized herein. Local authorities 
~however, adopt reguiations con-
sistent with this act and additional 
traffic regulatTOns which are not in 
conflict therewith. U.C.A-:--941-6-16 
(1953). (Emphasis added.] 
It is defendant's contention that the statutory langua~ 
emphasized immediately above is an express grant of authority to 
Midvale City to adopt Midvale City Ordinance §187(b). In furth 8 
support of this proposition, defendant directs this court to 
other statutory provisions. In Utah Code Ann. §10-8-1 to 91 
(1953), with regard to traffic regulations, the Legislature has 
provided: 
(The boards of commissioners and city 
councils of cities] may regulate the 
movement of ttaffic on the streets, side-
walks and public places, including the 
movement of pedestrians as well as of 
vehicles, and the cars and engines of 
railroads, street railroads and tramways, 
and may prevent racing and immoderate 
driving and riding. Id. §10-8-30 
Defendant submits that by this provision the legislature has mad~ 
an express grant of authority to the City of Midvale to regulate 
the movement of traffic within its boundaries. 
Finally, the legislature has recognized the inherent 
general police power of local authorities to regulate traffic 
within the political confines of their cities. 
The provisions of this chapter shall not 
be deemed to prevent local authorities 
with respect to streets and highways under 
their jurisdiction and within the reasonable 
exercise of the police power. • . • Id. 
§41-6-17 (Supp. 1979). 
It is apparent from the statutes cited above by defen-
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dant that Midvale City Ordinance §187(b) was adopted by Midvale 
City pursuant to authority granted to it by the legislature and 
pursuant to its general police power. In support of her posi-
tion, defendant directs this court's attention to the fact that 
other municipalities within this state have adopted provisions 
identical to Midvale City Ordinance §187(b). See,~· salt Lake 
City Traffic Code §46-12-206(2) (1974), "The driver of any 
vehicle traveling at an unlawful speed shall forfeit any right of 
way which he might otherwise have"; Murray Traffic and Motor 
Vehicle Code §18-146 (1975), "The driver of any vehicle traveling 
at an unlawful speed shall forfeit any right of way which he 
might otherwise have". 
Defendant maintains that Midvale City Ordinance §187(b) 
does not conflict with, and is indeed consistent with, the letter 
and spirit of the statutory traffic rules and regulations adopted 
by the legislature. This court has on numerous occasions been 
asked to declare a local ordinance void as being in conflict with 
a state statute. See, ~· Bate ~ Salt Lake City, 21 Utah 2d 
318, 445 P.2d 691 (1968); Salt Lake City~ Kusse, 97 Utah 113, 
93 P.2d 671 (1938). In both cases this court said that no 
conflict exists where the city does not attempt to authorize by 
its ordinance what the legislature has forbidden, or forbid what 
the legislature has expressly licensed, authorized or required. 
It is apparent that Midvale City Ordinance §187(b) passes these 
tests. 
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It is well established in Utah that a right of way co~ 
ferred by statute is not an absolute right of way, but that iti 
relative and that the rights and duties with respect to such a 
right of way must be examined in light of conditions existing ~ 
the time. See, ~' Hughes v. Hooper, 19 Utah 2d 389, 431 P.2o 
983 (1967); Bullock~ Luke, 98 Utah 501, 98 P.2d 350 (1940), J 
Hughes, 431 P.2d at 984, this court said, "Inasmuch as plaintiff 
was approaching from the right, he had the absolute right of w~ 
over the defendant. However, this right is not absolute •.• ,• 
In Bullock, 98 P.2d at 352, this court recognized that a stutu-
torily conferred right of way may be lost when it said, 
"Circumstances may be such, that by his own conduct, he who has 
the apparent right of way has lost the benefit of that right .. , 
This court's recognition of the relative nature of a 
statutorily conferred right of way is consistent with the posi· 
tions taken by a majority of courts in this country, as eviden~ 
by the following language from 3 Blashfield, Automobile Law and 
Practice §§114.107 and 109 (1965): 
General rules as to right of way at 
intersections, as based on position 
of the vehicles or priority of approach 
to the intersection, assume the normal, 
reasonable, and lawful operations of 
both vehicles, and a vehicle may be 
entitled to preferential right of way 
only where it proceeds in a lawful 
manner. So, where the driver of a 
vehicle approaching an intersection 
operates his automobile in an unlawful 
manner or in violation of law, he loses. 
his statutory preferential status, and 
the relative rights and duties of vehicles 
are governed by the common law. 
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* * * 
Statutes governing the rate of speed 
on approaching an intersection may 
affect the question of the right of 
way, the statutory right of way not 
being applicable if one or both vehicles 
are exceeding the speed limit •••• 
Defendant directs this court's attention to Utah Code 
Ann. §41-6-46 (Supp. 1979), wherein the legislature acknowledged 
that speed that is not reasonable and prudent under the con-
ditions is speed that is prirna facie unlawful. 
(1) No person shall drive a 
vehicle at a speed greater than is 
reasonable and prudent under the con-
ditions and having regard to the actual 
potential hazards that exist. Con-
sistent with the foregoing, every 
person shall drive at a safe and 
appropriate speed when approaching 
and crossing an intersection •••• 
(2) Where no special hazards exist 
the following speed shall be lawful but 
any speed in excess of said limit shall 
be prirna facie evidence that the speed 
is not reasonable or prudent and that 
it is unlawful •••• 
It is apparent from the above quoted language that the legisla-
ture has made it unlawful for a driver to approach an intersec-
tion at a speed that is not reasonable and prudent under the con-
ditions. But what are the ramifications when a driver does 
approach an intersection at a speed that is not reasonable and 
prudent? Defendant submits that because a statutorily conferred 
right of way in Utah is not absolute and may be lost under 
appropriate circumstances, it necessarily follows that a driver 
who enters an intersection at a speed that is not reasonable and 
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prudent under the circumstances has lost the benefit of any ri~ 
of way to which she might otherwise be entitled. From this it 
follows that Midvale City Ordinance §187(b), as well as the id~ 
tical ordinances adopted in Salt Lake City and Murray, are loc~ 
codifications of the non-inviolate nature of a statutorily con-
ferred right of way. These ordinances simply remove the benefit 
of the right of way conferred by the statute when the driver 
seeking to avail himself of a statute is operating his motor 
vehicle in an unlawful manner. 
Defendant emphasizes that other jurisdictions recogniu 
that a statutorily conferred right of way may be forfeited. In 
Dorey .Y..!. Myers, 211 Or. 631, 317 P.2d 585 (1957), an accident 
occurred at an intersection when the plaintiff's vehicle, 
approaching the intersection from the north, collided with the 
defendant's vehicle, approaching the intersection from the west, 
Because of the respective directions of the parties, plaintiff 
had a statutorily conferred right of way. At trial, the court 
gave the following jury instruction. 
Drivers, when approaching highway inter-
sections, shall look out for and give 
the right of way to vehicles on the 
right, simultaneously approaching a 
given point, whether such vehicle first 
enters and reaches the intersection or 
not. Any driver entering the intersection 
at an unlawful speed shall forfeit any 
right of way he would otherwise have 
under this subsection. 317 P.2d at 588. 
The latter portion of this instruction was given in accordance 
with Or. Rev. Stat. §483.202(1), which provided, "Any driver 
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entering an intersection at an unlawful speed shall forfeit any 
right of way he would otherwise have ••• " Plaintiff, who had 
the benefit of the statutory right of way, challenged the trial 
court's instruction of forfeiture of rights of way on the ground 
that in its initial instruction the lower court failed to tell 
the jury that forfeiture of right of way due to unlawful speed 
does not transfer the right of way to the other party. The 
Oregon Supreme Court, in affirming the trial court, noted that 
the lower court, upon the jury's request for further instruc-
tions, did in fact inform the jury that forfeiture of a right of 
way by operation of the above quoted statute did not transfer the 
right of way to the other party. The court concluded that the 
trial court fully covered the issue of forfeiture of right of way 
and that the trial court's instructions given thereon were 
proper. 
In Dawson~ Olson, 95 Idaho 295, 507 P.2d 804 (1973), 
the Idaho Supreme Court, by implication, acknowledged that where 
the law so requires, a driver who is operating her vehicle at an 
unlawful speed shall forfeit any right of way to which she other-
wise might be entitled. In the Dawson case, which involved an 
intersectional collision, the evidence showed a failure to stop 
at the stop sign by the driver of the first vehicle and speeding 
by the driver of the second vehicle. At trial the lower court 
gave the following instruction, "You are instructed that the 
driver of any vehicle traveling at an unlawful speed shall for-
feit any right of way which he might otherwise have." 507 P.2d 
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at 805. The representatives of the occupants of Vehicle 2 
excepted to this instruction as prejudicial error in that no law 
existed in support of such instruction. Accordingly, they moved 
for a new trial, which motion was granted by the lower court. 
The representatives of the occupants of Vehicle 1 appealed to ~ 
Supreme Court of Idaho. On appeal the court said, 
None of the relevant statutes in effect 
at the time of the accident in question 
mention forfeiture of right of way due to 
excessive speed. Instruction No. 26, 
having no statutory authority to support 
it, was an improper instruction of the 
law existing at the time of the accident. 
Although a statute providing for for-
feiture of right of way in cases of 
unlawful speed may have a salutary effect 
on discouraging excessive speed in con-
nection with open and possibly even 
favored intersections, no such provision 
exists in the Idaho Code presently.* * * 
Even if such a statute were in force in 
Idaho, howver, the fact that a favored 
driver under a right of way statute could 
forfeit his right of way by excessive 
speed would not transfer the right of way 
to the other driver. 507 P.2d at 806,807. 
That the above quoted language is an implicit recogni-
tion of the rule which defendant now seeks to have adopted by 
this court is apparent in light of the Idaho Supreme Court's 
decision in Bell Y..!. Carlson, 75 Idaho 193, 270 P.2d 420 (1954), 
wherein the court said: 
Furthermore, at the time of the accident, 
the Carlson car was admittedly traveling 
at an unlawful speed and under section 
49-520,I.C., in force at that time, this 
driver thereby forfeited any right of way 
he might otherwise have had. 270 P.2d at 
424. 
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Defendant notes that a substantial weight of authority 
supports her position. See ~· Ziegler v. Carley, 156 
Cal.App.2d 643, 320 P.2d 165 (1958); Amos v. Remington Arms 
Company, 117 Colo. 399, 188 P.2d 896 (1948); Zema~ Louviere, 
349 So.2d 420 (La.App. 1977); Holloway~ Cronk, 76 Mich.App. 
577, 257 N.W.2d 175 (1977); Merrill v. Kjelgren, 160 N.W.2d 155 
(Minn. 1968); Vavrina ~ Greczanik, 40 Ohio App.2d 129, 318 
N.E.2d 408 (1974) i Rickets~ Tusa, 214 N.W.2d 77 (S.D. 1974). 
Defendant submits that because plaintiff was determined 
to have been traveling at a speed that was not reasonable and 
prudent under the circumstances, plaintiff was traveling at an 
"unlawful speed" within the meaning of Midvale City Ordinance 
§187(b). Therefore, plaintiff, under this ordinance, forfeited 
any right of way to which she was otherwise entitled. Because 
the trial court refused defendant's requested jury instruction 
which stated the operation and effect of Midvale City Ordinance 
§187(b) and subsequently denied defendant's motion for a new 
trial based on the court's refusal to give such an instruction, 
defendant submits that the court twice committed prejudicial 
error. 
POINT III. 
BY ENGAGING IN EXTENSIVE EXAMINATION OF 
PLAINTIFF'S WITNESSES AND USURPING THE 
FUNCTION OF PLAINTIFF'S COUNSEL, THE COURT 
BELOW DENIED DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO A FAIR 
AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL. 
Defendant submits that the court below prejudiced 
defendant's right to a fair and impartial trial by its extensive 
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examination of plaintiff's witnesses. A review of the transcr~ 
of testimony given at trial reveals that the lower court asked 1 
less than 95 questions of witnesses during the trial (See 
Appendix). Of these 95 questions, 90 were asked of plaintiff's 
witnesses during examination by plaintiff's counsel or simply 
during examination of witnesses by plaintiff's counsel. The 
remaining 5 questions were asked during examination of witnesq 
by defendant's counsel. 
This court's most recent statement on this issue is 
found in State~ Mellen, 583 P.2d 46 (Utah 1978), a criminal 
proceeding wherein this court said: 
[T]he judge should and normally does 
exercise restraint in examining wit-
nesses, so that he does not unduly 
intrude into the trial or encroach upon 
the function of counsel. 
* * * Notwithstanding what has just been said, 
the judge does have a function beyond 
sitting as a comparatively silent monitor 
of proceedings. In order to discharge 
his responsibility of carrying out the 
above stated objective, it is within his 
prerogative to ask whatever questions of 
witnesses as in his judgment is [are] 
necessary or desirable to clarify, 
explain or add to the eVIdence as it 
relates to d'ISputed""Tssues. 58~P-:2d at 
48. [Emphasis added.] 
It is evident from the above quoted language that extensive eD 
mination of witnesses is not contemplated as being within the 
proper function of a trial court. Examination of witnesses by 
the trial court should be restricted to the purposes of 
clarifying, explaining or adding to evidence already accepted. 
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Defendant submits that the lower court abused its 
discretion by surpassing the limits on this discretion as set 
forth in the Mellen case. At one point, during direct examina-
tion of Officer Elsby by plaintiff's counsel, the court below 
asked 22 consecutive questions. (See Appendix, pp. 28-31). 
Examination of the questions submitted to witnesses by the trial 
court reveals that they were directed towards the introduction of 
evidence which plaintiff's counsel was capable of establishing 
without the help of the lower court. It is evident that the 
trial court did in fact encroach upon the functions of 
plaintiff's counsel. Because such conduct on the part of the 
trial court was an abuse of its discretion, defendant submits 
that such conduct denied her a fair and impartial trial. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's vehicle was not "an immediate hazard" within 
the meaning of the statute so as to require defendant to yield 
the right of way to plaintiff. Should this court agree with the 
lower court's determination that plaintiff's vehicle was, in 
fact, an "immediate hazard", defendant still could not be guilty 
of failure to yield the right of way to plaintiff because plain-
tiff, because she was operating her vehicle at a speed that was 
not reasonable and prudent under the circumstances, forfeited, 
under Midvale City Ordinance §187(b), any right of way to which 
she might otherwise be entitled. Because the lower court failed to 
instruct the jury as to the operation and effect of this ordi-
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nance, despite defendant's request to do so, the lower court~ 
mitted reversible error in failing to instruct the jury on the 
applicable law. Finally, the lower court committed reversible 
error by its extensive examination of witnesses and by usurpi~ 
the function of plaintiff's counsel. 
Inasmuch as the lower court denied defendant's motion 
for a new trial based upon such prejudicial errors, it is res~ 
tively submitted that the judgment of the lower court should ~ 
reversed with instructions to enter judgment in favor of the 
defendant or, in the alternative, that a new trial be granted. 
Dated this 10th day of October, 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STRONG & HANNI 
B.(__.-=---+-:z:~~~<:-;:;-:----.1-C-~~~~""1 L. E HAYS 
Attorneys for Defendant/A 
604 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Mailed two copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief H 
J. Kent Holland of Hanson, Russon, Hanson & Dunn, Attorneys for 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 702 Kearns Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84101, this 10th day of October, 1979. 
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APPENDIX 
Excerpts from transcript of testimony taken in lower 
court showing examination of witnesses by lower court. Excerpts 
are indexed to page and line of such transcript. 
WITNESS: GRANT W. ELSBY 
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. HOLLAND 
* * * 
Page 8 
THE COURT: Let's ask him this. Did you make 
2 various measurements, Sir? 
3 A. You mean at the time of the accident, or--
4 THE COURT: You made measurements I say, measure-
s ments of the street and other points of significance when 
6 you arrived? 
7 A. Yes. 
* * * 
15 THE COURT: Alright. How did you make the measure-
16 men ts? 
17 A. The measurements are made by a contraption that 
18 has a wheel and it is metered and it reads it off in feet 
19 and inches. 
20 THE COURT: You pole [roll] that from one point to another? 
21 A. We role it from one point to another, yes. 
22 THE COURT: I think he--can you tell us what measure-
23 ments you did make and what they were. What you put on the 
24 map. 
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25 A. The measurements we made was basically where both 
26 cars were situated in the road. 
* * * 
Page 9 
1 THE COURT: The record may show he has referred to 
2 the defendant. That is car mark marked on your diagram, s: 
3 with any marks or just a car? 
4 A. On the diagram, it is marked as Vehicle No., I 
5 believe 1, let me just check. 
* * * 
Page 10 
17 THE COURT: The answer will be stricken and I 
18 sustain the objection. Did you measure the streets, Offia 
19 the width of the street, each side of the street? 
20 
21 
A. As far as the width of the street, no, I did not. 
THE COURT: You didn't measure either side of the 
22 street? 
23 A. The only measurement I made was using this curb as 
24 a base line to put the cars in this position or from here 
25 but as far as measuring the width of the street, I did not 
26 measure the width of the street. 
27 THE COURT: Do you have a judgment from your observ 
28 tions and opinion how wide the travelled portion of that 
29 street is in th area of the accident? 
* * * 
Page 11 
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3 THE COURT: How wide is it? 
* * * 
10 THE COURT: The north half of the street, alright. 
11 How far is it from what you call PI to where the defendant's 
12 car came to a stop, Sir, or did you measure from the manhole 
13 cover? 
14 
18 
19 
A. We have from the manhole cover. 
* * * 
THE COURT: To the rear of the car. 
A. To the rear of the car from this point here to the 
20 rear of the car is approximately 94 feet 9 inches. 
* * * 
24 THE COURT: How far was it to the other car, what 
25 we have called the Plaintiff's Car? 
26 
29 
30 
1 
A. This car here? 
* * * 
THE COURT: From the manhole cover? 
A. From the manhole cover. 
Page 12 
THE COURT: How far from what you have called the 
2 PI from the manhole cover? 
3 A. From the probable PI to our reference point, the man-
4 hole cover is 11 feet 6 inches. 
5 THE COURT: That is 11 feet 6 inches East? 
6 A. Yes. 
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-7 THE COURT: So those cars would be an additional 
8 approximately 7 feet farther west than the measurements, 
9 the probable point of impact to wher they came to stop, 
10 the distance you measured plus approximately 7 feet? 
11 A. Seven feet, correct. 
12 THE COURT: Where was the impact of the Defendant's 
13 car, did you observe? 
14 A. On the Defendant's car? 
15 THE COURT: Yes. 
16 A. Was the right rear area. 
17 THE COURT: Well, was it on the rear to the right 
18 side of the rear or the rear of the right side, do you 
19 recall, Sir? 
20 A. Basically--
21 THE COURT: The back of the car to the right side 
22 or the side of the car to the back side if you recall? 
23 A. Around the rear fender and to the--I call it the 
24 right rear which would take in bumper and fender in area 
25 in here. 
26 THE COURT: Did you observe ever the damage to t~ 
27 Plaintiff's car? 
28 A. Yes. The damage to that car was the left rear. 
29 THE COURT: The left rear fender. What did you 
30 find at the probable point of impact, you say you found di 
Page 13 
1 anything else? 
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2 A. Dirt and broken glass. 
3 THE COURT: And in your experience as a police 
4 officer investigating accidents have you observed what 
5 happened when two vehicles collided, when a moving vehicle 
6 collides with another car, two moving vehicles, what happens 
7 to the dirt on the under side of the car? 
8 A. When they collide the dirt from the under carriage 
9 of the vehicles are jarred loose. 
10 THE COURT: That is called debry [debris] of the accident. 
11 And where does the glass come from? 
12 A. The glass from the taillight and the taillights 
13 from both vehicles were broken out and we found those lying 
14 THE COURT: In the general area of the probable 
15 point of impact? 
16 A. In the general area. 
17 THE COURT: What is the surface of this street? 
18 A. The surface is asphalt, extremely well travelled, 
19 polished as we would call it. 
20 THE COURT: Old asphalt then. 
21 A. Yes. 
22 THE COURT: And is the entire north half of the 
23 street asphalt? 
24 A. You mean this section here? 
25 THE COURT: Yes. 
26 A. Yes, it is. 
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27 THE COURT: Are there dividing lines, dividing la~ 
28 of traffic for west bound traffc on the north half of the 
29 street? 
30 A. The center lines, yes, they are divided. 
Page 14 
1 THE COURT: How many? How many lanes is it 
2 divided into by lanes? 
3 A. Oh, by lanes. 
4 THE COURT: By marking. 
5 A. We have two. There is two lanes for west bound 
6 traffic. 
7 THE COURT: One is wider than the other I take it 
8 from looking at the diagram? 
9 A. It appears the north section is a little bit wider. 
10 THE COURT: Which would include would it generally 
11 be a parking area? 
12 A. Yes. There are parking stalls here. 
13 THE COURT: And which lane was the probable point 
14 of impact in which lane, Sir? 
15 A. It was on the inside lane closest to the island. 
16 
17 
6 
THE COURT: Alright, you may continue, Mr. Holland. 
MR. HOLLAND: Thank you very much, Your Honor. 
Page 15 
* * * 
Q. Alright. In your training as a police officer, 
7 were you ever trained to make a coefficiency of friction 
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B test? 
9 THE COURT: On the surface of a highway. 
10 Q. On the surface of a highway? 
11 A. Yes, I have. 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION BY MR. SUMMERHAYS 
Page 16 
* * * 
lB THE COURT: Was there any difference in the surface 
19 of the highway that you could observe between where the 
20 test was made and the area where the accident occurred? 
21 A. I could tell no difference in the surface of the 
22 road. 
9 
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. HOLLAND 
Page 17 
* * * 
THE COURT: He is going to tell us what he did. 
10 How did you make the test, Sir? 
11 A. The test, I drove my police vehicle at a given 
12 speed and at a given point I applied the brakes. 
13 THE COURT: Do you recall what speed you drove at? 
14 A. Thirty miles an hour. 
15 THE COURT: At thirty, alright. 
16 A. At thirty miles an hour and then we applied the 
17 brakes at a given point, measured the amount of skid marks 
18 and in that way were able to determine the coeff iciency or 
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19 the drag factor of the roadway. 
20 THE COURT: Based upon the length and time it took 
21 to stop by--where did you get the figures you used? 
22 A. North Western University, they publish a book and a 
23 scale that we use. 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION BY MR. SUMMERHAYS 
Page 18 
* * * 
13 THE COURT: You have got a length of time he is 
14 asking you, after you apply the brakes, it takes some ti• 
15 to get the brakes to take hold and get applied? 
16 A. You mean the reaction time from the time you take 
17 your foot off the gas to the brake? 
* * * 
23 THE COURT: What he is talking about you don't leM 
24 a tire mark until the wheels lock? 
25 A. That is correct. 
26 THE COURT: If there is any slowing down of the 
27 wheels before they lock you are not leaving a tire mark, a 
28 skid mark at that time? 
29 A. That would be correct. 
11 
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. HOLLAND 
Page 19 
* * * 
THE COURT: What is the coefficient of friction 
12 you determined from the brake marks you made at thirty mil 
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13 an hour? 
14 A. We came up with sixty-five, sixty-five coefficient 
15 of friction. 
16 THE COURT: Sixty-five. Is that generally used 
17 with sixty-five percent, is that the general terminology 
18 or what is it, .65? 
19 A. I believe so. 
* * * 
Page 20 
1 THE COURT: What do you have tire marks or were 
2 they skid marks could you determine? 
3 
4 
A. They were skid marks. 
THE COURT: Leave black rubber on the lawn? 
5 A. Not black rubber but, you could tell where the 
6 tires had bounced up and they drug through the snow. 
* * * 
Page 21 
* * * 
17 THE COURT: How many brake marks did you measure 
18 prior to the point of impact, Sir? 
19 Q. How many wheel marks did you mark as--
20 A. There was two distinct lines showing the left and 
21 the right tires. 
22 THE COURT: Both the front and rear tires, could 
23 determine from observation of the skid marks whether all were 
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24 locked or not? 
25 A. In my opinion it appeared that all four were lockec 
26 THE COURT: They tracked pretty well into each ot~ 
27 then? 
28 A. Both cars were tracking fairly straight. 
29 THE COURT: So you feel you had--you couldn't tell 
30 though--which ones locked first, the front or the back? 
Page 22 
l A. I could not tell that no. 
2 THE COURT: Could you tell whether they all four 
3 left actually the same amount of mark or were you able to 
4 determine how much each wheel left? 
5 A. I did not determine. I just determined the overall 
6 from the start to the stopping. 
7 THE COURT: You couldn't determine how far the 
8 front locked or how far the back locked, a total of all 
9 of them? 
10 A. No. 
11 THE COURT: Including the total of the front, the 
12 total of the back is that correct, Sir? 
13 A. That is all it is, yes. 
14 THE COURT: Alright. 
15 Q. Now, this possible point of impact that you have 
16 marked on here, do you recall how far it was from the end 
17 the island to that portion? 
18 A. From the probable point of impact to the end of 
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19 the island is 4'5". 
20 THE COURT: Which direction, Sir? 
21 A. The point of the island or the end of the island 
22 would be 4'5" farther east. 
23 THE COURT: The impact then was 4' West of the 
24 end of the island? 
25 A. That is correct. 
26 THE COURT: How far from the north of the island 
27 was it did you measure that or from the manhole? 
28 A. To the north of the island? 
29 THE COURT: Yes. Everything is north of the island 
30 isn't it? 
Page 23 
1 A. Well, the accident--what was your question--no, we 
2 brought our other measurements as far as putting this car 
3 off this curb here and came this way. I don't come out this 
4 way. 
* * * 
Page 26 
* * * 
14 THE COURT: Was that stop sign there the day of the 
15 accident, Sir? 
16 A. Yes, it was, yes. 
* * * 
26 THE COURT: Let's see that, Sir. You are standing 
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27 on the island aren't you, Sir? 
28 A. In relationship to the end of the island. 
29 THE COURT: You are standing west of the island 
30 where you determined the probable impact. You are stand~ 
Page 27 
1 on the island in an area east and west of the end of the 
2 island? 
3 A. Correct. 
* * * 
12 THE COURT: How far west is that from the end of 
13 the island generally? 
14 A. I am approximately here because I am showing since 
15 Mr. Summerhays' diagram is to scale, I am looking approxi: 
16 just like this, this is what I am looking at this--
* * * 
Page 28 
* * * 
22 THE COURT: We are only concerned about the plai~ 
23 Was she injured, did you observe whether she was or was n 
24 
25 
A. Yes, I observed she was injured. 
THE COURT: You can tell us what you observed as 
26 to her condition. 
27 Q. What did you observe as to her condition? 
28 A. At that point I determined there was some type of 
29 either back or neck type or spinal injury. 
* * * 
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Page 29 
* * * 
26 THE COURT: Do you recall, driver No. 2 you talked 
27 to you say? 
28 A. Yes. 
* * * 
Page 30 
* * * 
19 THE COURT: Where did it take place? 
20 A. It took place, I can't really remember the exact 
21 location we were but it ws in the general area of the acci-
22 dent. 
23 THE COURT: Who else was present? 
24 A. Whoever was in the defendant's vehicle, the--
25 a police officer and there were several firemen around. 
26 THE COURT: Were they involved in the conversation 
27 or just in the general area? 
28 A. I think they were just in the general area trying 
29 to hear and see what was going on. 
30 THE COURT: And how long after you arrived did it 
Page 31 
1 take place, just your general, best estimate. 
2 A. Maybe ten, fifteen minutes. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. SUMMERHAYS 
* * * 
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Page 38 
* * * 
26 THE COURT: All of the debry [debris] of impact w~ 
27 within that lane, that is what you are saying. 
28 A. Are you asking me that question? 
29 Yes, it was. 
* * * 
WITNESS: RACHEL ARHELINDA CINTRON DOYLE 
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. HOLLAND 
* * * 
Page 46 
* * * 
29 THE COURT: Where was your car when, you said you 
30 observed she wasn't going to stop is your testimony. Wh~ 
Page 47 
1 was your car at that time in relation to the intersectio~ 
2 A. I was approximately right about where the left 
3 hand turn--just above that, not quite--! don't know how b 
4 explain it. 
* * * 
Page 56 
* * * 
28 THE COURT: Where did you first see the defendant'1 
29 vehicle, the automobile driven by the defendant, where w~ 
30 it when you first saw it? 
Page 57 
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1 A. I first seen her when she was back in here. 
* * * 
6 THE COURT: Did you watch her continue to proceed 
7 from--
8 A. From the stop sign? 
9 THE COURT: Yes. 
10 A. Yes, I did. 
4 
5 
6 
7 
12 
* * * 
WITNESS, RUDOLF LIMPERT 
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. HOLLAND 
* * * 
Page 78b 
* * * 
THE COURT: Does that include perception you say? 
A. Yes. 
THE COURT: Perception and reaction? 
A. Yes, Your Honor. 
* * * 
THE COURT: Let's help the jury this way. At 
13 thirty-five miles per hour how far does--how fast does a car 
14 travel say--you have told us a second, Sir. 
15 A. Yes. 
* * * 
Page 78c 
* * * 
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19 THE COURT: Based on the thirty-five mile per hour 
20 assumption, what is the total reaction time? 
21 A. The total time consists of the reaction time of 
22 one second, the sliding time during which the vehicle 
23 slides and that is entirely out of control of the driver, 
24 is a function of the deceleration of the vehicle and the 
25 distance it slid and it take .9 seconds to slide from th~ 
26 five miles an hour a distance of 37.5 feet at a coeffici~ 
27 friction of .65 and then at the end of the 37.5 feet sli~ 
28 we have 26 feet unbraked travel and that takes • 8 seconds, 
29 .8 seconds. So if we add the .8 during the unbraked slidi 
30 from it where the skid marks stop to the point of impact, 
Page 78d 
l plus the sliding time of .9 gives us 1. 7 plus the one sect 
2 reaction time gives us 2.7 seconds during which Plaintiff 
3 had to react to lock the wheels, to take evasive action. 
* * * 
Page 78e 
* * * 
10 THE COURT: Let's ask him do you have any experio 
11 Dr. Limpert, in acceleration speeds of automobiles froma 
12 stopped position with a, say up to ten miles an hour, t~ 
13 acceleration speed? 
14 A. Yes, Your Honor. 
* * * 
Page 78g 
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30 
* * * 
THE COURT: When she reacted, that is--would that 
Page 78h 
l be proper? At the time she reacted, the Defendant would 
2 have been twenty feet back at the average of five? 
3 A. To make it exactly clear 2.7 seconds prior to the 
4 time of impact at the time the Plaintiff had to recognize 
5 the hazard. 
* * * 
10 THE COURT: Her reaction based upon the facts you 
11 had was at that point. 
12 A. Yes. When her brake began to react. 
22 
* * * 
Page 79 
* * * 
WITNESS: LONNIE M. HIYAGISHIMA 
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. HOLLAND 
THE COURT: Don't lead her, Sir. Just tell us where 
23 you were sitting what direction you were facing. 
24 A. Well, I was turned. 
* * * 
Page 81 
* * * 
13 THE COURT: Did you talk to Mrs. Doyle? 
14 A. No, I did not. 
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* * * 
28 THE COURT: Had you ever travelled on that Street 
29 before? 
30 A. Oh, Yes. 
* * * 
Page 85 
* * * 
26 THE COURT: Where was it in relation to the car 
27 you were in? 
28 A. I don't know. 
29 THE COURT: Front, along side or behind? 
30 A. It might have fell behind, I am not sure. 
30 
* * * 
Page 87 
* * * 
THE COURT: Did you observe whether there was anyb 
Page 88 
1 in the car other than the driver? 
2 
26 
A. I could see a passenger in the front. 
WITNESS: TANYA SALAZAR 
DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. HOLLAND 
* * * 
Page 92 
* * * 
THE COURT: What was your sister's condition at 
27 that time? 
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28 A. Well, she says that her--
29 THE COURT: No, how did she appear looking to you? 
30 A. Well, she was pale and she was waiving--
WITNESS: LYNNETTE LEMMON 
RECROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. HOLLAND 
* * * 
Page 112 
* * * 
5 THE COURT: Ask--don't--where was Rachael's car 
6 in relation to your mother's car when you looked around? 
7 A. When I looked around she was in the lanes like I 
8 described that was when it was just seconds before the impact, 
9 just really fast. 
* * * 
WITNESS: MRS. MILKOVICH 
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. HOLLAND 
* * * 
Page 123 
19 THE COURT: Did you ever see the other car, ever 
20 see it before the collision? 
21 A. No. 
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